Posts by Cassius

Don I note you did not comment on this:

Quote from Cassius

Would it start with "It depends on how you look at it"?

Would such a start be obvious, or controversial?

Does that mean that you think "it depends on how you look at it" would be incorrect?

In this case we're not talking about physics, where the ultimate questions certainly don't depend on how you look at it. Atoms and void don't exist or not depending on how we look at them.

And we're not really talking about individual feelings of pain and pleasure, which like snow is white honey is sweet are unmistakable.

But in regard to "pleasure" conceptually as the guide of life or "happiness" as the goal, does it in fact depend on how you choose to look at it?

Quote from Don

Nothing. I am in a neutral state, I am feeling neither pleasure nor pain.

Then you are not alive but dead.

Harrrrumph! Well, the absence of pain is not the highest pleasure.

If you are alive, you are *feeling*, experiencing sensations. Someone who is alive is always feeling...

As to especially "then you are not alive but dead" and also "someone who is alive is always feeling," that is not the way most people talk, and Cicero is going to win that argument every day of the week in front of most juries, Greek, Roman, or today. When it's Epicurus' turn to speak, he's going to have to give more explanation than that to satisfy any fair-minded jury.

In a recent zoom meeting TauPhi raised this issue in regard to "the size of the sun is as it appears to be" (and perhaps as to other contexts as well). He said in essence that "sloganeering" can be fun but it is not persuasive.

Not saying that you or Epicurus are sloganeering or not being a fair-minded juror of course, but I think you know what I mean! What we have looks like sloganeering because the enemies of Epicurus have selectively preserved the part they want to keep without the part that explains it.

When people of good faith are being approached with something new, they have to be brought along at the right speed. I'm thinking more along the lines of the way Frances Wright has Epicurus speaking to Zeno in A Few Days In Athens, there needs to be a "wind-up" before the pitch. "If you are alive you are feeling something" and "absence of pain is pleasure" and "absence of pain is in fact the highest pleasure" are smoking-hot fastballs on which most batters are going to strike out.

But we're not trying to deceive the batter and strike him out by throwing it past him. We're trying to telegraph the pitch, and deliver it right over the plate so the batter can hit it out of the park.

Quote from Don

The fact - yes, fact - is that if you are alive, you're feeling something positive or negative. There is no "middle ground" and no "neutral" feeling. "Meh, I'm okay" is still positive, albeit at a low level of intensity.

Maybe what I am saying is so obvious that it doesn't need to be said.

I'm looking for "what would Epicurus have said himself if he had been present with Cicero or Plutarch and been allowed to speak further beyond what Torquatus was allowed to say, or beyond what Cicero or Plutarch quoted of him.

When Cicero/Plutarch said "everyone knows that there is a state between pain and pleasure where we aren't feeling much of anything," and "everyone knows that absence of pain is certainly not the height of pleasure," what's the first thing out of Epicurus' mouth?

Would it start with "It depends on how you look at it"?

Would such a start be obvious, or controversial?

Don -- Yes that circle represents another model. Like any other model I would expect that the author of the model would say that it is grounded in reality, so I would say the original question remains.

For example, all of those headings around the circumference are labels that the model-writer has assigned based on his or her experience. Would it be any less legitimate to assign them differently?

So the question that I underlies the whole discussion is: What is the authority or foundation of this or any other model?

Are both Epicurus' model (with no middle ground) and the majority model (with a middle ground) equally legitimate in terms of evidence, differing only in conceptual labelling?

Epicurus obviously thought that it made sense to use a model in which there is no middle ground. Plato, Cicero, et al. prefer a model in which there is a middle ground. Is there really a difference in real-world evidence that says that one model conforms with reality more than does the other?

Now obviously I think the Epicurean model provides a far superior method of analysis. By affirming that there is a bright line between pleasure and pain you can make everything fall on one side or the other and see much more clearly that even non-stimulated situations are pleasure or pain. But i also think it is important to state that this is a model that our minds need to comprehend, and not leave it to speculation that there might be some kind of natural law or evidence or force that compels us to say that this model is "true to the evidence" while the other model is "false to the evidence."

As Joshua stated several times in the episode, I think Epicurus and we agree that pleasure and pain are highly subjective, even in terms of likes and dislikes as to food. So who are we to say to Cicero "No you wrong - when you're not in stimulative pain or pleasure, you must still use the same terms (pain or pleasure) to describe the condition that you are in."

Cicero and Plutarch are leaving out that what Epicurus is not saying "You're missing the obvious - when you think you are in neutral you are the same as if you're eating the best steak of your life!"

Instead, what Epicurus is doing is stating a conceptual framework that allows us to analyze the full problem more productively. Epicurus isn't exactly saying to the world: "No, when you're not being stimulated one way or the other, you may not realize it, but you're still being stimulated." The world says that's not true because they know the difference between numbness and eating the best steak they've ever had.

What seems to be in issue is labeling rather than evidence. And what we're arguing about with Cicero as to what to label is what constitutes a healthy state of peak performance of mind and body.

The problem facing us is that the view that "all you have to do is remove pain and you are in the greatest pleasure possible." That's being taken by some as a statement that you can reach the highest pleasure possible by numbing your mind and body as with a drug.

I think we're saying pretty much the opposite - that you want your mind and body to be MORE sensitive to what's going on in them and whether they are healthy or not. In the case of Chrysippus' hand the assertion is that the hand is in its normal operating condition, which in the case of the limited abilities of a hand a statement of peak condition. In the case of the mind, however, the mind isn't in peak condition unless it understands how the universe operates,that we aren't subject to supernatural gods or punishment/reward by supernatural forces after death, and that we can have the confident expectation of remaining in that condition.

That latter condition of the mind is the opposite of "emptying" or "numbing" the mind so as to allegedly automatically achieve its peak pleasure. That peak performance of the mind is going to require understanding of the nature of things (as listed above) which requires intellectual effort.

And it seems to me that in order to explain the model it is helpful to make clear that what we're talking about isn't that the general public has defective senses, but rather what they are missing is a conceptual model that is required for the proper understanding of the best life.

Yes, Happy Birthday Bryan! Thank you for all that you do!

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One of the things I included in both episodes 298 and 299 was that I thought that lucretius' description of the pleasure that comes from knowing that we are free from the ills that so many others are subject to is probably a good example of this "non-moving" type of pleasure, and that seems consistent with what you've suggested above. But I don't know anything about how to explain "katastematic" so that this type of pleasure jumps easily to mind as being associated with that word. It's a mental viewpoint that you can hold unshakeably and isn't subject to being shaken very easily (or at all) but I'd like to see a word picture that can be associated with "katastematic" that serves as a better analogy as to why this is so.

I can see why kinetic gets tagged easily with motion, and the intuitive opposite of motion is "at rest" or "not moving" but as you say there's work to be done on making this more clear.

Quote from Don

But I've never liked the static or rest analogies. Off the top of my head, I'd be more readily drawn to a clear blue sky, free of clouds, and the night sky awash with various stars, planets, the moon. Still workshopping this

I agree that eventually the goal is to state specific examples of the type of pleasure that is meant. And I think the examples you are giving are correct. But I'm concerned that you and I reach the same conclusions but only after years of looking at the question, and I think that it would be desirable to put some meat on the bones of "katastematic" that would make that journey easier for people who first approach the question. Right now we might as well call it 'abracadabra pleasure' or "gibberish pleasura" instead of katastematic pleasure and extremely few would be any less confused by the term. And that seems to me a large part of the reason that so many are getting away with describing katastematic pleasure as the "real pleasure" that is what Epicurus was really after, instead of only one slice of a larger pie that constitutes the full meaning of "pleasure."

Also, if the car analogy works, that would suggest that a "ship at sea" vs a "ship in port" analogy would also work. If that one works, I'd say (or hope) that people would be less likely to think that "a ship in port" is superior to or could take the place of "a ship at sea" because most people would intuitively understand that sailing at sea is the real reason for having a ship in in the first place, and therefore at least as important as being in port, though both are natural parts of the life of a ship.

Quote from Don

To answer your question, I see katastematic pleasure as that which results, at least in part, from the weeding out of fear of the gods and death. Once those are truly rooted out - not just intellectually but viscerally - they don't come back. Without those fears and anxieties, the mind can remain untroubled. That's katastematic pleasure. A firm state of being.

Kinetic pleasure are all the pleasures that arise in the moment, from pleasant memories to drinking with friends to eating food.

That's the nutshell.

Yes, in this case I worded the question the way I did for a purpose, and added what seems to me to be the very understandable, and in this case likely correct interpretation of the specific phrases.

You're describing in your answer kinetic pleasure and katastematic pleasure but to my mind it's more important first to convey what kinetic and katastematic mean, so that there is no implication that the entire term is some kind of made up jargon that only Epicurus understood.

Kinetic is a word that has meaning in Greek just like katastematic. Is it not of first importance to understand what they mean separately before combining them with pleasure?

That's what the proposed summary does, and it seems to me that it's likely correct. Starting at that point would avoid the ambiguity that arises in talking about which attributes of a thing are primary, which are secondary, etc.

In this case, I do agree that "a firm state of being" is probably the primary sense of katastematic, and something surrounding "motion" is probably the primary sense of kinetic.

And I also agree that "that which results, at least in part, from the weeding out of fear of the gods and death" makes up a major component of what's being referenced as katastematic.

But with the word katastematic, in contrast with kinetic, we're using a word that has no clear English analog. With kinetic we can grasp intuitively why Cicero describes the pleasures as those that "move" us. But there's no equivalent point of reference with "katastematic" to keep people from going off into any wild tangent that they might personally want to entertain as to what it means.

I'd say Grok's proposal of an analogy makes considerable sense. A car in motion versus a car parked in a garage. That's a down to earth example that - if valid - makes clear that we're talking about easily understandable concepts, and not just using a term that makes "absence of pain" even more difficult to understand.

And with that as background, I'd say that there's no direct and necessary relationship between absence of pain and "katastematic pleasure." I'd say the relationship that's important is that pleasure is the opposite of pain, so there's either pleasure or pain, not one of the other. Katastematic and kinetic are two types of pleasure, but "absence of pain" can arise from the presence of any kind of moving or continuous pleasures.

Right now, as 90%+ of the world is talking about it, they are saying or implying that absence of pain according to Epicurus is katastematic pleasure, when they should be saying simply that absence of pain is pleasure.

I know you're not doing that yourself, Don, I'm just pointing out that this confusion has very damaging consequences, and we need better ways to clear up this confusion. And probably that better way involves finding ways to de-mystify the word "katastematic."

I've added this one to substack here:

Was Epicurus Right That There Are Only Two Feelings - Pleasure And Pain?

If so, why? Today we address that question in Episode 299 of the Lucretius Today podcast.

epicureanfriends.substack.com

Episode 299 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today our episode is entitled: "Was Epicurus Right That There Are Only Two Feelings - Pleasure And Pain?

Quote

Epicurus is on record for including both kinetic and katastematic pleasures within his definition of "pleasure." ... It is the exclusivity of "getting stuck in" only seeing kinetic pleasures as pleasure that Epicurus is objecting to here with τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας.

These two sentences here I think are beyond dispute and are definitely among the first things that anyone should take away from this subject.

As a comparison for testing a "generic" response, I posed the exact same question to Grok. At this point I am just thinking out loud and not saying that Grok has it right by any means:

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The Greek terms "kinetic" (κινετικός, kinetikos) and "katastematic" (καταστηματικός, katastematikos) can be understood through their etymological roots and usage in broader Greek contexts, drawing on general Greek authorities such as lexicographers (e.g., Liddell-Scott-Jones) and philosophical or scientific texts (e.g., Aristotle, Plato, or Hellenistic sources). Below, I provide the primary, generic meanings of these terms and how I would explain them to students new to Greek, focusing on their essential linguistic and conceptual significance.Primary Generic Meanings

1. Kinetic (κινετικός):
   • Etymology: Derived from κίνηση (kinesis), meaning "motion," "movement," or "change."
   • Primary Meaning: Pertaining to motion, activity, or change. In Greek texts, it often describes anything that involves physical or metaphorical movement, such as the motion of bodies (e.g., in Aristotle’s physics) or active processes.
   • Context: Used in natural philosophy (e.g., Aristotle’s Physics) to describe things that are in motion or capable of causing motion. For example, kinetic energy or force is associated with change or activity, as opposed to stasis.
   • Essence: Something that is dynamic, active, or in a state of change.
2. Katastematic (καταστηματικός):
   • Etymology: Derived from κατάστημα (katastema), meaning "state," "condition," or "establishment," which itself comes from καθίστημι (kathistemi), meaning "to set in place," "to establish," or "to bring into a certain state."
   • Primary Meaning: Pertaining to a settled, stable, or fixed state or condition. It implies something that is steady, enduring, or in a state of rest or equilibrium.
   • Context: Found in contexts like Hellenistic philosophy or technical writings to denote a stable condition or structure, often contrasted with change or flux. For example, in Stoic or Aristotelian discussions, it might refer to a state of being or a fixed disposition.
   • Essence: Something that is stable, settled, or enduring.

Addressing Your Proposed Metaphors - Your suggested metaphors ("foreground vs. background," "less available vs. more available," and "calm vs. wavy") do not fully align with the generic Greek meanings:

• Foreground vs. Background: This implies a perceptual or attentional distinction, which isn’t central to the Greek terms. Kinetic refers to motion, not necessarily something that "stands out," and katastematic refers to a stable state, not a "background" condition.
• Less Available vs. More Available: This suggests accessibility or availability, which isn’t relevant to the core meanings. Both terms describe qualities of phenomena (motion vs. stability), not their availability.
• Calm vs. Wavy: This is closer but imprecise. "Wavy" implies fluctuation, which is only one aspect of kinetic (motion can be steady or purposeful, not just wavy). "Calm" fits katastematic better, as it suggests stability, but it’s not the full picture, as katastematic can apply to any fixed state, not just calmness.

A Better Metaphor for Students - To convey the essence to beginners, I’d use the metaphor of a moving car vs. a parked car:

• Kinetic: Like a car driving down the road—active, moving, changing position.
• Katastematic: Like a car parked in a garage—still, stable, in a fixed state.

This metaphor captures the contrast between motion (kinetic) and rest/stability (katastematic) in a clear, relatable way, grounded in the terms’ etymological and generic Greek usage.

Quote from Don

Epicurus is on record for including both kinetic and katastematic pleasures within his definition of "pleasure." I have now come to understand kinetic pleasures as those arising from factors and circumstances and that “stand out” from our “background” state of katastematic pleasures within ourselves. A metaphor discussed at the EpicureanFriends forum for this was that katastematic pleasures are the calm ocean while kinetic pleasures are the waves which we can surf. We can enjoy both floating on the calm water as well as the catching of the waves and “shooting the curl.” While Epicurus conveys (along with Metrodorus and Philodemus) that we can be more confident in katastematic pleasures, we continue to "delight" in kinetic pleasures when they are available. It is the exclusivity of "getting stuck in" only seeing kinetic pleasures as pleasure that Epicurus is objecting to here with τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας.

Don:

Would you say that the first and primary meaning that should be associated with the term "kinetic " is "something that arises from factors and circumstances that 'stand out,'" and that the term "katastematic" should be associated with "a background state within ourselves about which we can be more confident?"

If not, what would you say is the first and primary meaning that should be associated with the terms "kinetic" and "katastematic"?

Asked another way, if you are lecturing to a group of students who are new to Greek, what is the first and most important thing you would tell them that makes up the essence of the terms "kinetic" and "katastematic? Would you say that "foreground vs. background" and "less available vs. more available" and "calm vs wavey" would convey the essential meaning of kinetic vs katastematic?

As i am editing I can point out that this week we focus on the second of three challenges Cicero raised in Section XX of part 3 of Tusculan disputations. - that Epicurus is wrong that there are only two feelings, pleasure and pain.

This challenge is common to both Cicero and Plutarch, and it's important for us to think about all possible responses because a lot rides on it.

We phrased the question in terms of "What was Epicurus's justification for dividing feeling into only two categories- pleasure and pain? Why not three, or thirty, or three hundred, giving names to many more types or categories of experiences? Where do we find the basis for this classification?

Here's on of the places Cicero states his complaint, in section III-XX.¶

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It may be said, What! do you imagine Epicurus really meant this, and that he maintained anything so sensual? Indeed I do not imagine so, for I am sensible that he has uttered many excellent things and sentiments, and delivered maxims of great weight. Therefore, as I said before, I am speaking of his acuteness, not of his morals. Though he should hold those pleasures in contempt, which he just now commended, yet I must remember wherein he places the chief good. For he was not contented with barely saying this, but he has explained what he meant: he says, that taste, and embraces, and sports, and music, and those forms which affect the eyes with pleasure, are the chief good. Have I invented this? have I misrepresented him? I should be glad to be confuted; for what am I endeavouring at, but to clear up truth in every question? Well, but the same man says, that pleasure is at its height where pain ceases, and that to be free from all pain is the very greatest pleasure. Here are three very great mistakes in a very few words. One is, that he contradicts himself; for, but just now, he could not imagine anything good, unless the senses were in a manner tickled with some pleasure; but now he says that to be free from pain is the highest pleasure. Can any one contradict himself more? The next mistake is, that where there is naturally a threefold division, the first, to be pleased; next, to be in pain; the last, to be affected neither by pleasure nor pain: he imagines the first and the last to be the same, and makes no difference betwixt pleasure and a cessation of pain. The last mistake he falls into in common with some others; which is this: that as virtue is the most desirable thing, and as philosophy has been investigated with a view to the attainment of it, he has separated the chief good from virtue. But he commends virtue, and that frequently; and indeed C. Gracchus, when he had made the largest distributions of the public money, and had exhausted the treasury, nevertheless spoke much of defending the treasury. What signifies what men say, when we see what they do? That Piso, who was surnamed Frugal, had always harangued against the law that was proposed for distributing the corn, but when it had passed, though a man of consular dignity, he came to receive the corn. Gracchus observed Piso standing in the court, and asked him, in the hearing of the people, how it was consistent for him to take corn by a law he had himself opposed? “It was,” said he, “against your distributing my goods to every man as you thought proper; but, as you do so, I claim my share.” Did not this grave and wise man sufficiently show that the public revenue was dissipated by the Sempronian law? Read Gracchus's speeches, and you will pronounce him the advocate of the treasury. Epicurus denies that any one can live pleasantly who does not lead a life of virtue; he denies that fortune has any power over a wise man: he prefers a spare diet to great plenty, and maintains that a wise man is always happy. All these things become a philosopher to say, but they are not consistent with pleasure. But the reply is, that he doth not mean that pleasure: let him mean any pleasure, it must be such a one as makes no part of virtue. But suppose we are mistaken as to his pleasure, are we so too as to his pain? I maintain therefore the impropriety of language which that man uses when talking of virtue, who would measure every great evil by pain?

Quote from Raphael Raul

I hold that reason is the tool that guides the Pleasure that we are experiencing, not the other way around. For example, pleasures come, while eating or drinking, let's say, and while one eats and drinks, one may desire to eat and drink past a reasonable limit. Thus, a reasonable person employs "reason" to decide, "No, I will stop eating and drinking now, because if I continue, I will get drunk and have indigestion later. So yes, we feel Pleasure, and those pleasures can be good or bad if we do not use reason to decide how far or how much Pleasure we should have.

The question of the proper order of priority is why according to Diogenes Laertius Epicurus held that:

"Logic they reject as misleading. For they say it is sufficient for physicists to be guided by what things say of themselves. Thus in The Canon Epicurus says that the tests of truth are the sensations and concepts and the feelings.... Nor is there anything which can refute the sensations. For a similar sensation cannot refute a similar because it is equivalent in validity, nor a dissimilar a dissimilar, for the objects of which they are the criteria are not the same; nor again can reason, for all reason is dependent upon sensations; .... And seeing and hearing are as much facts as feeling pain.

In your examples, the only factor that makes reason useful is that the feeling of pleasure and pain consistently report certain conditions as desirable and others as undesirable. It is not possible through formula and logical assertions alone to conclude that apple pie is good or bad. One piece is frequently good; ten pieces in a row are frequently bad. It is the fact of the result producing pain that we store in memory and retrieve to conclude through reasoning that we should stop after eating one piece. Reasoning is the mechanism through which we predict the future, but it was the original feelings that were gathered by memory and reason that led us to assert the rule of thumb as to how much to eat. And even that rule of thumb remains dependent on circumstances. Five pieces of apple pie in a row would ordinarily create pain, but if you have been starving in a desert for weeks. even more than five pieces may still be enjoyable. Reason is certainly a valuable tool, but circumstances change, and in order of priority pleasure and pain of actual people in actual life take precedence. In Jefferson's phrase, "the earth belongs to the living."

Quote from Raphael Raul

However, the main argument concerns the almost total subject view that all members held at last Sunday's discussion. The idea that all is subjective and that there is no objectivity possible in making societal valuations.

The goal of establishing the validity and necessity of "objectivity" is exactly what Epicurean canonics is all about, and no one establishes and defends objectivity better than Epicurus. The question is finding a true and real basis for objectivity, one which does not require made-up gods or standards of certainty that are logically impossible to achieve. What you are looking for in rejecting total subjectivism is exactly what Epicurus is doing.

It is Plato and the Stoics (including Cicero in our current discussions) who are the relativists and subjectivists. They assert groundless speculation about eternal virtues and forms as the real truth, but in fact their standards of truth do not exist. There are no eternal standards of right and wrong or laws that apply to all people at all places at all times.

This is where Epicurus saw that it is impossible to live successfully without a proper standard of what is true and real. Although there are no eternal forms or virtues, nature does exist with regularity that is predictable, and that regularity is how we deduce that there are some things that are regularly and even eternally the same in the nature of the atoms and the void. It is Epicurus who properly establishes that some things that are eternal and reliable do exist, and from that eternal nature we observe that nature has given us the feelings of pleasure and pain. We can use reasoning to help us understand the validity of following pleasure and avoiding pain, but in reality nature tells us directly through feeling, and we cannot override what nature gives us. Pleasure and pain are just as real to us as seeing of hearing or touching, no matter how we may try to reason ourselves into believing otherwise.

So Epicurus is not being inconsistent in (1) placing the guidance of nature through pleasure and pain above reason, while at the same time (2) saying that the wise man is going to conduct all his affairs throughout his life using reason. The two go hand in hand, but it is not reason that allows us to experience pleasure and avoid pain, but pleasure and pain which instruct reason on how to employ itself.

Thank you for that post Raphael! You're covering several things and I expect there will be lots of reactions to different parts.

I am inclined to want to focus on what I think is a position we share, which is that Epicurean philosophy does not in fact mean that a life of push-pin is as well spent as a life of enthusiastic pursuit of nuclear research and invention. It's because I believe that as well that I campaign against empty use terms such as "absence of pain" which can either be very profound and essential, or a straight road to decadence and disaster, depending on how (and if) one defines them.

But I think I will start with this one:

Quote from Raphael Raul

However, Epicureans maintain that all is subjective, as I was made aware of during our discussion, and objective valuations cannot be made. What Epicureans hold is in contradiction to what Epicurus actually did, which was to attempt to arrive at ideas that he developed through objective reasoning.

.. because I think you are exactly right to judge Epicureans and the Epicureans according to the active and engaged lives that they lived, and not according to the head-in-the-sand isolationism which is held up today as the Epicurean ideal.

But the real heart of the question is the role of pleasure vs reason as the guide. I gather you're concerned that it is a problem to hold reason to be a "tool" for happiness, rather than a guide toward happiness. I think the answer to that concern is found in pursuing the same line of thinking that leads you to conclude that a life of pushpins is unacceptable to you.

The ultimate issue is that "reason" alone cannot give you the answer to the question of what you "should" do without first calculating the reasonable course in relation to a goal. And only pleasure and pain can ultimately determine whether a goal is worth pursuing. No amount of reasoning can deliver the positive emotional response that you are looking for in what you are considering to be worthy goals. Only the feeling of pleasure and pain can sort out those questions in the ultimate sense. Yes we must employ reason so we can project the results of our actions based on experience, but no amount of calculation can tell us whether our goals are worth pursuing or not.

That's what I think you are hearing in those who, like Lucretius, are calling "divine pleasure the guide of life." As a guide pleasure does not reject the use of reason or friendship or virtue or any other tool toward reaching the goal, but a perspective that places "nature" firmly in the driver's seat as to what to pursue and what to avoid has to acknowledge that by nature there is only pleasure and pain as feelings of guidance.

There's of course a lot more to say and I am sure others will say it better, but I think your reaction that you see a problem is much more to be appreciated than a reaction that some might have to the effect that "i'm ok with pushpins as long as I never suffer a moment of pain!" That attitude is NOT Epicurean.

In the text for this episode, Cicero uses the story of the Gracchi and their reforms to illustrate how dramatically words and goals can differ. It will be worth knowing a little about that background, so here's a pretty good video setting the stage.

Cicero specifically mentions the Sempronian law:

Lex Sempronia - Wikipedia

Also:

Gracchan opposition

Since Piso was in Sicily during his entire consulship, ancient sources do not tell his attitude towards Tiberius Gracchus, who as plebeian tribune moved an ambitious set of reforms to redistribute Roman public lands. It is generally assumed that Piso was among his opponents, because he was later an outspoken enemy of Gaius Gracchus (Tiberius' younger brother), but several politicians initially supported Tiberius and later opposed his reforms or his attempt to be reelected as tribune, starting with Scaevola, Piso's consular colleague.^[31] D C Earl suggests that Piso initially regarded Tiberius' program with a "benevolent neutrality" as he had connections with the Fulvii Flacci and the patrician Claudii, who were Gracchan allies.^[32]

The main anecdote for Piso's opposition is an anecdote placed in his mouth by Cicero. According to Cicero, after Gaius Gracchus passed a law establishing a subsidised grain supply over Piso's opposition, Piso appeared in the queue and when Gaius enquired as to his hypocrisy, he responded "I'm not keen, Gracchus... on you getting the idea of sharing out my property man by man, but if that's what you're going to do, I'll take my cut".^[33][34][35]

for now one more example:

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Epicurus makes an important distinction between necessary and unnecessary desires. Necessary desires are those which are necessary to produce happiness, such as desiring to get rid of bodily pain, or desiring a state of inner tranquility. He writes that “the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and once this is obtained the tempest of the soul is quelled.” Only when we are in pain do we feel the need to seek pleasure, a need which inevitably only produces greater pain. In order to get rid of this pain-pleasure-pain cycle, we need to cultivate a mindset in which there is no pain. Thus the aim is not the positive pursuit of pleasure, as it was for Aristippus. The aim is rather the attaining of a neutral state which is best described as “peace of mind” or even “emptiness,” to use a Buddhist expression. The Greek word Epicurus uses for this state is ataraxia, which literally means “freedom from worry.”